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Since 1957, New York courts have required contingent fee
lawyers to file "closing statements" that disclose settlement amounts,
lawyers' fees, an accounting of expenses, and other information. This
Article provides a preliminary analysis of these data for the period 2004-
2013. Among this Article's findings are that settlement rates in New
York state courts are very high (84%) relative to previous studies; that
very few cases are resolved by dispositive motions; that litigated cases
and settled cases have almost exactly the same average recovery; that
median litigation expenses, other than attorney's fees, are 3% of gross
recovery; that claims are disproportionately from poor neighborhoods;
and that attorneys' fees are almost always one-third of net recovery,
which is the maximum allowed by law.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1957, most contingent fee lawyers in New York City have
been required to file a "closing statement" with the clerk of the appellate
division when a case is resolved, whether the case is resolved by
settlement, judgment, or abandonment by the client. The closing
statement includes the amount of any settlement or judgment, the
amount paid to the lawyer, and an itemization of the lawyer's expenses.
Because they provide information on issues not generally available
elsewhere, closing statements provide a unique window into contingent
fee litigation. This Article aims to provide a preliminary analysis of the
data in the closing statements.
In the next Part we provide information on the origin and
content of the data. In Part II we provide evidence on rates at which
claims are abandoned, settled, or adjudicated. We find that the
settlement rate in the New York data is significantly higher than
previous estimates. In Part III we provide information on plaintiff
recovery rates. We find that once we account for the riskiness of going
to trial, there is relatively little difference between settlement amounts
and amounts received in adjudication. In Part IV we provide evidence
on the size and composition of expenses and fees. In Part V we present
evidence on the demographic distribution of tort claims. Specifically we
find that the number of claims is negatively correlated with income. The
final Part concludes.
I. RETAINER AND CLOSING STATEMENTS
In the 1920s, the bar and bench in New York City became
increasingly concerned about the conduct of contingent fee lawyers. In
1928, the bar associations for New York City, Manhattan, and the
Bronx petitioned the Appellate Division of the First Judicial
Department of the New York Supreme Court, which had supervisory
powers over state courts in Manhattan and the Bronx, to conduct an
investigation. The Appellate Division ordered Justice Wasservogel to
produce a report.
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FIGURE 1: JUSTICE ISIDOR WASSERVOGEL
JUSTICE ISIDORE WASSERVOGEL
Who Has Been Nared to Condue
Amubulance-Chasig Inquiry.
PHOTOGRAPH SOURCES: Left: Pick Wasservogel for Bar Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1928, at 12;
Right: Isidor Wasservogel, HIST. Soc'y N.Y. CTs., http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-
new-york/history-legal-bench-appellate-01.html?http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-
new-york/luminaries-appellate/wasservogel-isidor.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/8TL5-MPJH] (photo undated).
Judge Wasservogel held hearings, and, in 1928, issued a report
that concluded:
The evidence adduced before me bears out the truth of the allegations contained in the
petition of the three bar associations, to the effect that there exists in this Judicial
Department a practice commonly known as "ambulance chasing."
Personal injury cases have,in the main, come into the hands of relatively few lawyers,
some of whom have conducted their practice purely as a business, to the detriment of the
public and the profession. 1
To "prevent a recurrence of the improper practices by which
attorneys secure retainers from injured persons," the report
recommended that attorneys be required to file "a copy of the retainer
1. ISIDOR WASSERVOGEL, REPORT TO APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 4
(1928).
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by which the attorney for the plaintiff was engaged, and also an
affidavit by such attorney stating that the case was not solicited directly
or indirectly, and setting forth how the retainer was obtained." 2 The
report also recommended that all settlements be approved by the court. 3
In 1929, the First Department implemented some of the
recommendations of the report. In particular, they required plaintiffs'
lawyers to file "retainer statements" with the court within ten days of
signing the contingent fee agreements. The retainer statement sets out
"the terms of compensation." 4 Regulations also required lawyers to mail
their clients a written statement accounting for any judgment or
settlement within ten days of receiving the money.5 If the lawyer was
unable to find the client, the lawyer was required to send the accounting
to the court, but otherwise the accounting was sent only to the client.6
In 1955, Judge Wasservogel, then retired from his judgeship and
back in private practice, was again asked to produce a report on
contingent fee lawyers, this time with a charge to consider capping
contingent fees. This report was commissioned not only by the First
Department (Manhattan and the Bronx), but also by the Second
Department, which covers the rest of New York City as well as Long
Island and five counties immediately north of New York City (Duchess,
Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester). This report used the
retainer statement required by the 1929 regulations to ascertain that
60% of retainers filed with the First and Second Judicial Departments
were "50% Retainers." That is, over half of retainer contracts specified
that 50% of any judgment or settlement went to the lawyer.7 The report
considered, but did not recommend, caps on fees, although it did
mention the possibility of "a sliding scale of fees" whereby lawyers
would get 50% of damages up to $2,000, 40% of damages between $2,000
and $10,000, and one-third of amounts over $10,000.8 So that the court
could ensure that clients received their proper share, the report
recommended that "closing statements" be filed with the court
specifying how a case was terminated, the gross amount of recovery or
2. Id. at 8-9.
3. Id. at 12.
4. SPECIAL R. REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS-AT-LAW IN THE
FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 4-A, reprinted in PARSONS' PRACTICE MANUAL OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK (Austin B. Griffin & John T. Fitzpatrick eds., 7th ed. 1930).
5. Id. 4-B.
6. Id.
7. ISIDOR WASSERVOGEL, REPORT, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE MATTER OF THE
HEARINGS ORDERED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AND FOR THE FIRST
AND SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS REGARDING A PROPOSED RULE TO LIMIT COMPENSATION OF
PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS 38 (1955).
8. Id. at 43-44.
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settlement, the amounts paid to the lawyer and client, and an
itemization of costs. 9
The First Department responded with new regulations in 1957.
These regulations capped the contingent fee in "action[s] for personal
injury or wrongful death" at one-third or a sliding scale similar to the
one set out in Judge Wasservogel's report, although the scale was a
little less generous to the lawyer. 10 The regulations also required that
the percentage that goes to the lawyer, whether a simple flat percentage
or a percentage based on the sliding scale, must be computed "on the
net sum recovered after deducting taxable costs and disbursements and
expenses for legal, medical, investigative or other services properly
chargeable to the claim."" Most importantly for the purposes of this
Article, the regulations required that lawyers file with the court a
"closing statement" within fifteen days of receiving any money on behalf
of a client, whether in judgment or settlement. The closing statement
records "[t]he gross amount of the recovery, . . . [t]he taxable costs and
disbursements, ... [t]he net amount of the recovery actually received
by the client, . . . [t]he amount of the compensation actually received
or retained by the attorney," and some additional information not
important to this Article. 12 The Second and Fourth Departments issued
similar rules. 13 The First and Second Departments continue to require
closing statements in much the same form, although the Fourth
Department repealed its requirement in 2003.
The First Department regulations were modified periodically
between 1957 and 2002. By 2002, the requirement to file retainer and
closing statements had expanded to include tort cases involving
personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, as well as
condemnation and change of grade proceedings. 1 4 The 2002 regulations
9. Id. at 39-40.
10. SPECIAL R. REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS-AT-LAW IN THE
FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 4(b), reprinted in CLEVENGER'S ANNUAL PRACTICE OF NEW YORK 21-
10 (Jos. R. Clevenger ed., 1957) [hereinafter 1957 SPECIAL R.].
11. Id. 4(c). A rule change in 2014 allowed the lawyer's percentage to be based on gross
recovery. See infra note 16.
12. 1957 SPECIAL R., supra note 10, 4(e).
13. Because this Article uses data only from the First Department, it does not analyze rules
from other departments in any detail.
14. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.7(a)(1) (2002):
Every attorney who, in connection with any action or claim for damages for personal
injuries or for property damages or for death or loss of services resulting from personal
injuries, or in connection with any claim in condemnation or change of grade
proceedings, accepts a retainer or enters into an agreement, express or implied, for
compensation for services rendered . .. whereby his compensation is to be dependent or
contingent in whole or in part upon the successful prosecution or settlement
thereof ....
2017] 1975
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also make clear that a closing statement must be filed even if the
plaintiff recovers nothing, whether due to an adverse judgment or
because the plaintiff abandoned the claim.15 There have been no
significant changes to the regulations since 2002.16
The First Department's retainer and closing statement
requirements apply to all attorneys who practice in Manhattan or the
Bronx, regardless of the court they file a case in and regardless of
whether they practice regularly in New York City.1 7 This means that
filing statements should be filed for cases brought in federal court. In
fact, there are over sixteen thousand closing statements relating to
federal cases. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of closing
statements involve cases filed in state court, and by far the largest
number (129,269) involve cases filed in the New York Supreme Court,
which is the trial court of general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is
the state trial court one would expect would hear tort cases of any
significance. A few thousand closing statements relate to county court
and surrogate's court (probate) proceedings, and a handful of cases were
filed in small claims court, justice or police court, or out of state.
Retainer and closing statements are considered "confidential"
and information may not be "divulged or made available ... except
upon written order of the presiding justice of the Appellate Division."18
The authors of this Article obtained an order from the presiding justice
in 2014 allowing us access to retainer and closing statements from the
First Department, albeit with stringent restrictions to protect
confidentiality. The court administrator then provided us with PDFs of
retainer and closing statements filed in 2004-2013, as well as a "flat
file" compiled by court personnel in which some (but not all) of the
relevant information had been typed into a database similar to an Excel
spreadsheet. Unfortunately, the flat file does not contain key
Section (a) technically only applies to retainer statements, but section (b)(1) states that "[a] closing
statement shall be filed in connection with every claim . . . in which a retainer statement is
required." There are relatively few cases involving condemnation or change of grade. We are
looking for ways to analyze such cases separately or to exclude them.
15. See id. § 603.7(b)(1), (b)(2) Item 6 (stating that a "closing statement shall be filed in
connection with every claim, action or proceeding in which a retainer statement is required").
16. On February 19, 2014, the rules were changed to allow the lawyer's percentage to be
computed "on the gross sum recovered before deducting expenses and disbursements," if the client
agreed to that method in the retainer agreement. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 691.20(e)(3)(ii) (2017). Because the data analyzed here comes from 2004-2013, that change is not
relevant to this Article.
17. See N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.1(a) (2002) ("This Part shall apply to all
attorneys who are admitted to practice, reside in, commit acts in or who have offices in this judicial
department, or who are admitted to practice by a court of another jurisdiction and who practice
within this department .....
18. See id. § 603.7(c)(1).
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information, such as expenses or amounts paid to lawyer and client.
The authors of this Article have hand coded a random sample of the
PDFs and used that hand coding to generate the results presented in
Part IV. For future projects, the authors are also utilizing optical
character recognition ("OCR") software to extract this information from
the PDFs. This software converts information that was originally
handwritten or typed into a form that statistical software can analyze.
A typical retainer statement is displayed below, with identifying
information removed, as required by the court order.
FIGURE 2: SAMPLE RETAINER STATEMENT
RETAINER STATEMENT For *oIkme.
TO: OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
Retainer and Closing Statmnwits
Post Office Box 2016 K WA 3
Chureh Sulwe Statioun
New YorkNY 10008
4. *fcngaed by an attorney, name and offce addres of retaining attorney
5. Wga Sfro dtalk or prope tydamg date and pla of
2010 atNr we&Y 0
6. If codemnatlon or chage of grads proceeding:
(a) Ttleanddecription:
7. Nam add dcen Ilon and retai o f reerring cltnt:
Daled NEW YORK NY,
Retainer statements contain relatively little information-the
date of agreement, a summary of the terms of compensation (nearly
always one-third of recovery to the lawyer), the date and address of the
accident (or address of property condemned or subject to a grade
proceeding), and information about referrals.
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The next two pages display a typical closing statement in a
relatively large case, with identifying information removed, as required
by the court order.
FIGURE 3: PAGE 1 OF SAMPLE CLOSING STATEMENT
~ .,. - S IM ornICS unz
TO: OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
Retainer and Closing Statements
25 Beaver Street - 8t Floor -
New York, New York 10004
1.
5. (a) If action comenced, state date: , Court, Ousno Countyl and
(b( Was the action disposed of in open Court - m. If not and a Request for Judicial
Intervention was filed, state the data the Stipulation or Statement of Discontinuance was
filed with the Clerk of the Part to which the action was assigned - It not and
on Index number was assigned, but no Request for Judicial Intervention was filed, state
the date the Stipulation or Statehent of Discontinuance was filed with the Clerk - H.
6. Check items applicable: Settled I X ) or claim abandoned by client (_) or Judgment
6 0i Date of payment by carrier or defendent - _ Date of payment to client -
7. Gross amount of recovery (it judgment entered, including any interest, costs or
disbursements allowed): 4975,000.00.
9. Nam. and address of i t4- P- I.an
9. Nat amounts: TO CLIENT - $ 5043,09; COMPENSATION TO UNDERSIG4D - $1Q32;9.16. Also,
include the name(s), address(es) and amount(s) paid to attorneys participating in the
numbo is unknown to the undersiqued.
10. Compenastion fixed by: Retainer Agrement (): under scheduled [_)i or by Court
11. If compeneation fixed by Court: Name of Judge: WAj; Court: N/A; County: NI: Index
No, I/At and date of order: N/A,
12. Itemized statement of payments made for hospital, medical care or treatment; 1lens'
assignments: claimst and expenses on tbtlf of clientis), which would have been charged
against the client,* share of the recover toether with the nam, addtess, mount and
rusxon for each payment:
th mutof *7t for okrspreoto o
EU the Amount of 007,976,19 fox xeo ugmen t, of plaintiff** loan.
13. Itetried statement of the enmunts of expenses and disbursements paid or agrod to be paid
by others for expert testimony; investigative; or other services properly chargeable to
the recovery of damages, together with the name, addres and reason for each paymet:
SEE ATTACHED RIDER.
14. which a copy of this Closing Statement has been forwarded to the client:
DATED: New York, New York
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FIGURE 4: PAGE 2 OF SAMPLE CLOSING STATEMENT
CoulCerWatcdn Service Calendr Watchin $ 20.23
Supreme Queens. Summons and Conplant, IU, Note of Court Fifing Fees $ 445.70
$ 373.75
issue andoMotion
Own D.Mh0 xer~tinFeses $ 8115.00
Medil Recor $ 1,79.13
M ic E xpe nse: X ero Copies Expr ess nd C ertfid M a4 l M Isc $ 3 2 8 7
Item 1 on the first page (blanked out) is a code that identifies the
corresponding retainer statement. Item 2 (blanked out) is the name and
address of the client. Item 3 (blanked out) is the name of the plaintiffs.
Item 4 (blanked out) is the name of the defendants.
Item 5 on the first page indicates what court the case was filed
in. In some statements, the case was resolved before any court filing, in
which case this line is blank. Item 5 also provides other information
about court proceedings.
Item 6 specifies whether the case was settled, abandoned, or
resolved by judgment.
Item 7 indicates the gross recovery. Note that an amount is
specified, $975,000, even though Item 6 indicates that the case was
settled.
Item 9 indicates the amount paid to the client and to the various
lawyers in the case. In the case described in the closing statement, the
lawyers' fee was split among three law firms.
Item 12 indicates that the plaintiffs recovery was partially paid
to the workers' compensation fund, which had subrogation rights for
2017] 1979
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amounts it had previously paid the plaintiff. In addition, Item 12 shows
that the plaintiff had received a loan from a litigation financing
company, which was entitled to repayment out of the plaintiffs
recovery.
Expenses were too large to fit on Item 13 of the form, so the
lawyers attached a separate page or rider. This page indicates that
expenses totaled $20,138.80, of which over half was paid to doctors who
served as expert consultants or witnesses. Medical records cost
$1,479.13; $3,228.73 was paid for mailing, photocopying, travel and
other miscellaneous expenses; and smaller amounts were paid for
service of process, court fees, mediation, and other expenses. Together,
the information allows calculation of how the settlement was divided:
975,000.00 Gross Recovery
20,138.80 Expenses (2% of gross recovery)
954,861.20 Net Recovery (gross recovery minus expenses)
636,574.13 Total amount paid to the client or to reimburse
entities that previously paid the client
(66.67% of net recovery)
This is the sum of:
451,043.09 paid directly to the client
97,554.85 paid to workers compensation
fund
79,229.18 paid to litigation financing
company
317,994.48 Total amount paid to lawyers
(33.30% of net recovery)
This is the sum of:
143,229.18 paid to 1" law firm
95,486.12 paid to 2 " law firm
79,229.18 paid to 3" law firm
342.59 Unaccounted for (0.03% of net recovery)
The division of the recovery is relatively typical. Expenses are
low in relationship to gross recovery, reducing net recovery by only 2%.
The client received exactly two-thirds of net recovery, which is
consistent with a one-third contingent fee. Lawyer fees were shared
among three firms and totaled 33.30%, slightly less than the one-third
standard contingent fee. The numbers on the form do not add up
properly, as there is $342.59 unaccounted for. This amount probably
represents money paid to lawyers that was somehow omitted from the
form. If this amount were added to the amounts paid to lawyers
specified on the form, the total amount paid to lawyers would be exactly
one-third, as would accord with the standard contingency fee.
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While the closing statement discussed above is typical of a case
in which the plaintiff received a substantial settlement, in many cases
the plaintiff recovered nothing, either because the plaintiff abandoned
the case or because the plaintiff pursued the case to trial and lost.
Closing statements are filed even when cases were abandoned or result
in defense victories. In such cases, the plaintiffs lawyer receives no fee,
and there is no accounting of expenses.
II. SETTLEMENT RATES
Eisenberg and Lanvers have produced the most careful study of
settlement rates. Using a sample of filed cases they conclude that, in
the two federal district courts they analyzed, settlement rates were
57.7% and 71.6%. They note, however, that settlement rates in tort
cases were 63.8% and 87.2%.19 Nevertheless, it should be noted that
Eisenberg and Lanvers probably overstate the settlement rate for the
districts they study, because they cannot accurately distinguish
between settled and abandoned cases. They rely on "case disposition
codes" in docket sheets. Unlike the closing statements studied in this
Article, docket sheets do not cleanly divide cases into abandoned,
settled, or adjudicated categories. While about 22% of cases in docket
sheets are explicitly marked as "settled," settlement must be inferred
for other cases from "voluntary dismissals." This is problematic,
because voluntary dismissals could also be cases abandoned by the
plaintiff without settlement. This is especially likely, because the
number of cases explicitly categorized by Eisenberg and Lanvers as
"other withdrawn, no evidence of settlement" or "dismissal/withdrawal
to allow refiling" is less than 1%. That is, Eisenberg and Lanvers
categorize less than 1% of cases as abandoned, which is unrealistically
low. Some of the cases they classify as settled were almost certainly
abandoned. 20 Eisenberg and Lanvers also find that a substantial
fraction (about 13%) of federal cases are resolved by dispositive motions,
such as summary judgment or motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.
There is also a conventional wisdom that 95% of cases settle.
Although there is remarkably little evidence for this settlement rate
and it is well known among scholars that the settlement rate is well
below 95%, the conventional wisdom seems to be remarkably
persistent. One possible source of the 95% rate is Ross's classic study of
19. Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should
We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 130 (2009).
20. Id. at 127-28.
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closed auto insurance claims from 1962.21 Although that study is
sometimes cited for the idea that 95% or more of cases settle, that is a
misreading of Ross's findings. It is true that only 4% of claims resulted
in trial, but that does not mean that 96% settled, because 32% were
resolved with no recovery and no trial. Using the case disposition
categories employed here for the New York data, the 32% resolved
without recovery and without trial would be classified as abandoned.
That would mean that the settlement rate was only 64%. Unlike the
New York data studied here, Ross's data included cases resolved
without a lawyer. If only cases involving a lawyer are analyzed, the
settlement rate in Ross's data would rise to 73%, and the fraction of
represented cases in Ross's data that went to trial is 15%.
Because the New York closing statements clearly distinguish
between abandoned and settled cases, and because these data are much
more recent than Ross's, they provide new insights into modern
settlement rates in an important state court. Item 6 of the closing
statement, with a few adjustments, 22 allows categorization into three
rough "case dispositions": abandoned, settled, or adjudicated.
TABLE 1: CASE DISPOSITIONS
Unknown Abandoned Settled Adjudicated
Number 3766 38,532 246,542 3849
% of all cases 1.3% 13.2% 84.2% 1.3%
% of cases for
whichdipi - 13.3% 85.3% 1.3%
disposition
known
% of all cases
not abandoned
Total Cases: 292,689
As shown in Table 1 for the New York data, about 84% of all
cases settled, 13% were abandoned, and less than 2% went to trial or
were otherwise adjudicated. The 84% settlement rate is clearly lower
21. See H. LAURENCE ROss, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (2d ed. 1980). The figures in this paragraph are calculated by the authors of
this Article using data from page 217 of Ross's book. Of course, Ross's data is different from that
analyzed here because it involves only auto accidents, whereas the cases in the New York data
cover a wide range of torts, including medical malpractice and premises liability.
22. Cases that the closing statement says were "abandoned by client," but in which there was
a positive recovery (Item 7) were classified as of "unknown" disposition. Similarly, cases that were
"settled," but in which the recovery (Item 7) was zero were also classified as "unknown."
Fortunately, there were less than a thousand of such cases. Most cases listed as "unknown" in
Table 1 were cases where Item 6 was not recorded in the court's flat file, presumably because it
was not marked on the closing statement.
CONTINGENT FEE LITIGATION
than the 95% or 98% settlement rate that is sometimes mentioned but
within the range of settlement rates found by Eisenberg and Lanvers
for tort cases. As noted above, however, Eisenberg and Lanvers's
estimate counts abandonments as settlements. If abandoned New York
cases were also counted as settled, or if abandoned cases are excluded,
the settlement rate would be over 98%, which is extremely high.23
New York contingent fee litigation also differs from the federal
litigation studied by Eisenberg and Lanvers, in that dispositive motions
must be far less frequent in New York than the substantial fraction
(about 13%) of federal cases Eisenberg and Lanvers find were resolved
by dispositive motions. In the New York data, these would be
categorized as "adjudicated." Since less than 1.5% of New York cases
are adjudicated, it is clear that many fewer were resolved by dispositive
motions, such as summary judgment or motions to dismiss. This accords
with the general view that federal courts are more likely to grant
summary judgment than state courts, although the difference is more
stark than one might have expected.
It is also helpful to distinguish between cases that were resolved
before a lawsuit was filed and those that were resolved after. Obviously,
adjudicated cases were resolved after a lawsuit was filed, but cases can
be settled or abandoned before a lawsuit is filed. Fortunately, lawyers
are required to file closing statements even in such cases. Tables 2 and
3 show case dispositions depending on whether a suit was filed or not.
TABLE 2: CASE DISPOSITIONS, NO LAWSUIT FILED
Unknown Abandoned Settled Adjudicated
Number 2981 28,689 100,761 0
% of all cases 2.3% 21.7% 76.1% 0%
% of cases for which - 22.2% 77.8% 0%
disposition known
% of all cases not
- - 100% 0%
abandoned
Total Cases: 132,431
23. These calculations exclude unknown cases. If unknown cases were included the
settlement rate would still be above 97%. If one analyzed the closing statements of cases that were
filed in federal court, the settlement rate is 99.4%. The extremely small number of cases abandoned
(47) or adjudicated (44) suggests that lawyers who filed cases in federal court did not consistently
file closing statements.
2017] 1983
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TABLE 3: CASE DISPOSITIONS, LAWSUIT FILED
Unknown Abandoned Settled Adjudicated
Number 785 9,843 145,781 3849
% of all cases 0.5% 6.1% 91.0% 2.4%
% of cases for
which disposition - 6.2% 91.4% 2.4%
known
% of all cases not 
- 97.4% 2.6%
abandoned
Total Cases: 160,258
Interestingly, almost half of cases were resolved before a lawsuit
was filed. Note that these are cases in which the plaintiff had hired a
contingent fee lawyer (thus triggering the obligation to file a closing
statement), so these resolutions do not include cases resolved by
insurance companies or defendants without the involvement of a
plaintiffs lawyer. Cases resolved without filing a lawsuit are obviously
very different. Many more of them are abandoned (22% versus 6%),
fewer are settled (76% versus 91%), and, of course, none are
adjudicated. Interestingly, the settlement rate among filed cases is over
90%, which is higher than in the federal data studied by Eisenberg and
Lanvers, which was similarly restricted to cases in which lawsuits were
filed. 24
Settlement rates in the New York data are also much higher
than that reported in Ross's study of closed auto insurance claims
mentioned above. As noted above, if only cases involving a lawyer are
analyzed, the settlement rate in Ross's data is 73%, which would still
be much lower than in the New York data. Also, the percentage of
represented cases in Ross's data that went to trial is 15%, which is much
higher than in the New York data. If one looked at cases that resulted
in a lawsuit in Ross's data, the contrast to the New York data would be
even more extreme. In such cases, Ross's data show that only 51%
settled, 25% were tried, and 24% were abandoned. 2 5
24. Figures in Table 3 may slightly overstate the settlement rate because some cases may
have been misclassified as not filed when they were actually filed. Cases were classified as "not
filed" if no court is listed in Item 5 of the closing form. Cf. Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 19, at
126 (describing methodology for cases included in study). It is a reasonable assumption that such
cases were not filed in court, because, if they were, one would expect the court to be mentioned.
Nevertheless, about 20% of adjudicated cases also do not list a court in Item 5, suggesting that
some cases which do not list a court in Item 5 were cases in which a lawsuit was filed.
25. See supra note 21.
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III. AMOUNTS RECOVERED
Table 4 summarizes the amounts recovered.
TABLE 4: RECOVERY AMOUNTS
1985
Settled Cases Adjudicated Cases Adjudicated
Cases with Non-
Zero Recoveries
Mean (average) $89,168 $92,534 $315,187
10th percentile $1,534 0 $3,500
25th percentile $4,796 0 $10,000
50th percentile $12,000 0 $30,000(median)
75th percentile $37,500 $6,000 $148,153
90th percentile $125,000 $78,845 $659,772
95th percentile $300,000 $300,000 $1,385,527
99th percentile $1,305,681 $2,010,000 $5,000,000
N 246,540 3,849 1,130
The average recovery among settled and adjudicated cases is
remarkably similar, both around $90,000. The similar averages,
however, mask large differences in distributions. Plaintiffs win only
29% of adjudicated cases, so most adjudicated cases result in no
recovery for the plaintiff. In contrast, a settlement, by definition,
involves some payment to the plaintiff. Most recoveries in the dataset
are relatively small. Seventy-five percent of settlements are $37,500 or
less, and 75% of adjudicated cases result in judgments of $6,000 or less.
On the other hand, the distribution of adjudicated cases is dominated
by the fact that over 70% of cases result in no recovery at all. If attention
is restricted to adjudicated cases with nonzero recoveries, the seventy-
fifth percentile jumps to $148,153.
It is also helpful to look at the distributions graphically: 26
26. These graphs use kernel density estimation to create curves from data that is inherently
discrete and lumpy.
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FIGURE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF RECOVERIES IN SETTLED AND
ADJUDICATED CASES
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In both graphs, the horizontal axis has been truncated at $100,000. If
the graphs included higher amounts, they would be nearly
unintelligible because of the long "tail" to the right caused by a few very
high settlements and judgments. If the horizontal axis included all
recoveries, there would be a spike at the left next to the vertical axis,
and then a nearly flat line just above the horizontal axis.
Figure 5 shows the large fraction of adjudicated cases that result
in no plaintiff recovery, but does not reveal much about the rest. Settled
cases mostly result in relatively low recoveries, and, in general, higher
settlements are less common than lower settlements. Figure 6 shows
that, if one restricts attention to adjudicated cases with positive
recoveries, adjudicated recoveries tend to be higher than settled
recoveries. There are fewer very low recoveries and more recoveries
larger than about $20,000.
The distribution of recoveries sheds some light on the selection
of disputes for litigation. 27 Priest and Klein's famous 1984 article
asserted that litigated cases are a nonrandom sample of all cases. 28 This
Article has spawned a large theoretical and empirical literature. 29 Most
of the empirical literature focuses on Priest and Klein's prediction that
plaintiffs will generally win 50% of tried cases. The New York data
analyzed here allow additional insight because they reveal settlement
amounts. The fact that mean recoveries for settled and adjudicated
cases are nearly identical might suggest that there is relatively little
selection. That is, settled and adjudicated cases are similar, at least in
their average value. This is inconsistent, for example, with simple
asymmetric information models of litigation and settlement, which
would suggest that litigated cases would be skewed toward those that
favor the more informed party. 30 So, if, as is usually assumed in tort
cases, the defendant is better informed, one would expect defendants to
settle when the plaintiff has a strong case and adjudicate when the
plaintiffs case is weak. This would imply that settlements should, on
average, be higher than adjudicated recoveries.
27. See Eric Helland et al., Maybe There Is No Bias in the Selection ofDisputes for Litigation,
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. (forthcoming) (discussing in detail the implications of the
New York data for the selection of disputes for litigation).
28. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984).
29. See Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. 209, 210 n.1 (2014) (noting that the 1984 Priest and Klein article is "one of the most
influential law articles of all time" and citing some of the relevant literature).
30. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15
RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and
the Allocation ofLitigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986); Abraham L. Wickelgren, Law and
Economics of Settlement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 330, 336 (Jennifer
Arlen ed., Edward Elgar Publishers 2013).
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Nevertheless, the fact that average recoveries are similar in
litigated and settled cases could be made consistent with selection
theory, if additional assumptions are made. For example, if plaintiffs
were usually better informed, that would lead to adjudicated cases with
higher average recoveries. So, if plaintiffs were sometimes better
informed, and other times defendants were better informed, the net
result might be that average settlements and adjudicated recoveries
were the same, as observed.
The fact that plaintiffs win only 29% of litigated cases is
inconsistent with Priest and Klein's famous 50% prediction but is
consistent with their broader theory, which provides many explanations
for deviations from 50%, including asymmetric stakes.31 If, for example,
defendants suffer reputational harm from an adverse judgment, they
have more at stake and one would expect defendants to settle all but
the cases they are most likely to win, leading to plaintiff trial win rates
less than 50%.
IV. FEES AND EXPENSES
The analysis of attorneys' fees and expenses is, at the moment,
tentative, because New York court administrators did not include this
information in their flat file, so we must extract it from the PDFs. The
information in this Part is based on hand coding a random sample of
one hundred cases.
Expenses are a heterogeneous category that includes court filing
fees, expert fees, record fees, postage, transportation, service of process,
deposition transcription, and other services. Lawyer fees are, of course,
distinct from expenses. Median expenses were 3% of recoveries.
Average expenses were somewhat higher (5%), because of a small
number of cases with very high expenses. In general, while expenses
went up as recoveries went up, the percentage of money paid in
expenses went down. As would be expected, the expense percentage also
went up when cases were filed (as opposed to resolved before suit) and
as the case went through more procedural stages (such as motions),
although even if a suit was filed and a motion or other procedure
requiring a "request for judicial intervention" was initiated, the expense
percentage only rose to 6%. Experts were hired in 21% of cases, and, if
an expert was hired, expert fees averaged $3,654 per case. Court fees
averaged $321 in the cases where suit was filed.
31. See Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Priest-Klein Hypotheses: Proofs and
Generality, 48 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 59 (2016).
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Attorneys' fees were exactly one-third of net recovery in most
cases. Net recovery is total recovery minus expenses. One-third is the
maximum allowed by the New York courts, except when a sliding scale
fee is used, which is rare. Even when there were deviations from one-
third, the deviations were usually small (e.g. lawyers' fees between 30%
and 40%). In only three cases were fees lower than 30%, and in only two
cases were fees higher than 40%. One possible explanation for fees
lower than a third is that the retainer contract specified a lower
percentage. Unfortunately, we were not able to confirm that by looking
at the retainer statements, because retainer statements were missing
for those cases, probably because they were signed before 2004 and thus
not turned over to us. Another reason attorneys' fees are sometimes
lower than one-third is that, in medical malpractice cases, a lower
percentage is required by New York law. 32 Attorneys' fees higher than
one-third are more puzzling because they are forbidden by law. In one
case, it appears that the lawyers may have received judicial permission
to go over the cap.
V. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF TORT CLAIMS
Because the data set includes the plaintiffs address, it is
possible to map claims by zip code:
32. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney 2017).
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FIGURE 7: SUITS PER CAPITA (BY ZIP CODE)
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FIGURE 8: INCOME PER CAPITA (BY ZIP CODE)
Median Household Income
under $39,000
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No data
Figure 7 shows claims per capita. Zip codes with more suits are
darker. Figure 8 shows income per capita.3 3 Zip codes with lower
median household income are darker. The two maps are almost
identical. Places with many claims per capita (dark areas on Figure 7),
such as Harlem and the Bronx, tend to be places with low per capita
income (dark areas on Figure 8). Conversely, places with relatively few
suits (light areas on Figure 7), such as the Upper East and Upper West
Sides of Manhattan, tend to be places with high incomes (light areas on
Figure 8).
There are a number of possible explanations for these patterns
that we intend to explore in more depth in a future article. One
possibility is that poor people are more likely to be injured, perhaps
because they are more likely to live or work in less safe conditions, more
33. AM. FACTFINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (last
visited Oct. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cclJ994-DYV5] (figures created using data from the 2010 U.S.
Census).
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likely to use unsafe products, and/or more likely to receive inferior
medical care. Another possibility is that poor people are more likely to
hire a lawyer and make a claim if injured, perhaps because they are less
likely to have insurance or because recoveries of a few thousand dollars,
which make up a substantial fraction of all recoveries, would mean
more to a poor person than to a rich person.
CONCLUSION
The New York courts have collected a wealth of data on
contingent fee litigation. This Article barely scratches the surface of
what the data contain. Among this Article's findings are that settlement
rates are higher than in federal court, that very few cases are resolved
by dispositive motions, that litigated cases and settled cases have
almost exactly the same average recovery, that poor people are more
likely to make a tort claim, and that expenses average 3% of gross
recovery, while attorneys' fees are almost always one-third of net
recovery, the maximum allowed by law.
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